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Robert L. Rabint
In determining the procedural safeguards to be afforded to
property interests under the due process clauses of the Constitution,
the Supreme Court has assumed that the principal value at stake is
the interest in an accurate decision, and that this interest can be
protected only by requiring some form of evidentiary hearing. Focus-
ing on the job security cases, in particular the recent decision in
Bishop v. Wood, Professor Rabin contends that these assumptions
have resulted in setting too high a threshold for the recognition of
property rights and in an unwarranted deference to state law in
determining the scope of constitutionally protected property. He
argues that in addition to the interest in an accurate decision, courts
should attend to the interest in a reasoned explanation for the termi-
nation of employment, an interest that can be secured through a
modest form of judicial review without requiring a costly evidentiary
hearing.
The need for security of interest in government largess was
sharply underscored two decades ago in the years of national trauma
we now refer to as the McCarthy era. The mid-1950s witnessed the
acceleration of two phenomena that have redefined the individual's
relationship to the state: the ubiquitous growth of the public sector
and the consequent proliferation of relationships binding the citizen
to the state.' Charles Reich expressed concern with these develop-
ments when he wrote of an emergent "new property"-a conception
of property that both delineated the various forms of government
largess distributed in a welfare state and prescribed the need for
safeguards against government officials abusing their power by en-
t Professor of Law, Stanford University. An earlier draft was read by Professors Paul
Brest, Owen Fiss, and Tom Grey. I benefited greatly from their suggestions, as well as our
many earlier discussions of the issues addressed in this article.
I The Civil Service reform movement may have been partially responsive to similar
disquietude about security of interest, but that movement was primarily a product of concern
about the spoils system and its effects on the quality of government service. For a discussion
of the Civil Service reform movement, see D. ROSENBLOOM, FEDERAL SERVICE AND THE
CONSTITUTION 70-93 (1971); Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service
Employees? 124 U. PA. L. REV. 942, 954-61 (1976).
60
Job Security and Due Process
croaching upon the autonomy of recipients. 2
A particularly distressing feature of the McCarthy period was
the runaway impulse of government to demand loyalty-more seri-
ously, to punish those having the temerity to maintain idiosyncratic
beliefs. It was concern for the dissenter and the eccentric, whether
in the political arena or in matters of life-style, that informed the
commentary of the early 1960s in the critical backlash against the
preceding years of state-coerced conformity.3 Given the massive
presence of the federal and state governments in allocating jobs,
licenses, housing and welfare benefits, the courts were inevitably
confronted with a wide range of property claims arising out of the
administrative termination of government largess.'
Assumptions that had been treated as received wisdom were
called into question-most critically, the assumption that recipients
of government "benefits" held only a "privilege" subject to what-
ever limitations the government saw fit to attach. 5 Once it was
conceded that the recipient of largess was entitled to some degree
of security, it followed that official conduct had to be channeled
through regularized procedures that insured fair treatment. With a
heightened sense of exigency, the administrative process was mea-
sured against constitutional norms of procedural due process, and
concern about linking changes of status to the right to a hearing
became paramount.' The leading case of Goldberg v. Kelly,7 involv-
2 See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964).
3 See, e.g., id.; Linde, Justice Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare State-Constitutional
Rights in the Public Sector, 39 WASH. U.L.Q. 4 (1964). An early exposition, focusing on the
cases arising out of the governmental preoccupation with loyalty during the 1950s, is Davis,
The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1956).
A number of these cases are discussed in Reich, supra note 2. He makes Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), the cornerstone of his analysis. Nestor's wife had her Social
Security benefits cut off after he was deported for past membership in the Communist Party.
A divided Court upheld the statutory provisions allowing the retroactive termination of
benefits in the face of a constitutional attack on due process grounds. Because old age benefits
were involved and the termination was for "deviant" political beliefs, Reich regarded the case
as a prototypical instance of the power of the state to coerce the individual into conformist
behavior.
In the area of public employment job security, which will be the primary focus of this
article, a number of key cases were decided. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local
473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); In re Anastopolo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (involving occupational licensing standards); Bailey v. Ri-
chardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
5 For a detailed treatment of the rights-privilege distinction, see Van Alstyne, The De-
mise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 H~Av. L. REv. 1439 (1968);
K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE §§ 7.11-.13 (1958 & Supp. 1970).
' The job security cases cited in note 4 supra are instructive. The majority opinion of
the court of appeals in Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally
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ing the right of recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC) to an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of
benefits, presaged claims for judicial recognition of entitlements to
a wide variety of forms of government largess.'
This article will be primarily concerned with a single important
line of cases in which the Supreme Court has been notably unable
to develop a satisfying approach for resolving claims to security of
interest in government largess. I will focus on the job retention
cases, using the recent decision in Bishop v. Wood' as the pivot for
the analysis. While my main concern will be with the employment
cases, I have a somewhat broader design in mind. Since the tension
between individual security and bureaucratic efficiency underlying
the job retention cases is an identifiable theme in virtually every
entitlement controversy, I view the Court's inability to devise a
satisfying framework for analysis in the employment cases as symp-
tomatic of a general failure to deal with entitlements and related
procedural due process claims in sufficiently flexible terms.' ° Thus,
divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1958), rests on the premise that public employment is a privilege
and not a right-making due process inapplicable. A decade later, in Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, the Court conceded that procedural due process guarantees
are triggered by government employment, although it ruled they were not violated in the
immediate case. The stage had been set for this new conception of government employment
in the preceding case of Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1969), where the Court read the
statute broadly to require adjudicatory safeguards, and thereby avoided what it regarded as
possible due process concerns raised by a narrower construction. See generally Van Alstyne,
supra note 5, at 1461.
7 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Goldberg was not, of course, the first case to recognize the importance of security of
interest in government largess. The traditional distinction between rights and privileges
assumed that some kinds of interests-"rights"-were entitled to procedural due process
safeguards. See authorities cited in note 5 supra. But from a historical perspective it is clear
that the case law of the 1970s rejecting the rights-privileges approach dates from and is based
upon the Goldberg recognition of a "property" interest in welfare benefits. See generally
Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. Rav. 1267 (1975).
96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976).
10 Throughout this article, "entitlements" and "property" interests will be referred to
interchangeably. I will not attempt to deal with the "liberty" interest that is regularly enter-
tained, and just as regularly put to rest, in each of the recent Supreme Court decisions on
job security. See Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2079-80 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 156-58 (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572-75 (1972); Perry v. Sinder-
mann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972).
The Court's analysis of the liberty interest is generally framed in terms of whether the
ground for dismissal of the employee is sufficiently stigmatic to hamper seriously the em-
ployee's opportunity to find similar work elsewhere. The compartmentalization of "liberty"
and "property" claims in job security cases is open to question, as is the Court's narrow view
of what constitutes a "stigma." But an adequate treatment of the issue would extend far
beyond the scope of the present article.
The Court's general unwillingness to interpret damage to reputation as a violation of a
"liberty" interest protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments is vividly illustrated by
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in offering a new approach to the resolution of job security issues it
will be necessary to survey analogous lines of conflict.
After examining the approach taken by the Court in linking a
theory of entitlements to procedural due process, I will explore the
purposes that such a linkage is intended to serve. I will argue that
the failure to identify all of the values protected by due process has
led to an inadequate conception of entitlements and an insufficient
range of due process safeguards. In particular, I will propose a more
expansive approach that stresses the singular importance of receiv-
ing an adequate explanation for adverse treatment whenever sub-
stantial individual interests are at stake. I will then attempt to
demonstrate concretely, through the job security cases, how this
approach would be utilized.
I. ENTITLEMENT THEORY AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY: THE DIALOGUE
IN GOLDBERG V. KELLY AND ITS PROGENY
Goldberg v. Kelly" established the terms of the dialogue in
procedural due process cases ranging from revocation of parole to
suspension of drivers' licenses.12 In holding that AFDC recipients
were entitled to a pretermination evidentiary hearing, the Court
first noted that welfare benefits were "a matter of statutory entitle-
ment," adding in a footnote that such benefits might realistically
be viewed as a form of property. 3 Assuming, then, that due process
safeguards applied, the Court went on to assert that "[t]he extent
to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is
influenced by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer
grievous loss,' . . . and depends upon whether the recipient's inter-
est in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in
Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976), a recent decision rejecting a claimed infringement of
due process where the claimant had been designated an "active shoplifter," despite the
absence of a criminal conviction, in a flyer distributed by the local police. The Court refused
to "single out reputation as a candidate for special protection over and above other interests
that may be protected by state law." Id. at 1160.
" 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
12 See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971);
cases discussed in text and notes at notes 15-28 infra. Both the scope of the entitlements and
the applicability of the due process safeguards required by Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970), remain the subject of debate within the social welfare area itself. See, e.g., Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
13 397 U.S. at 262 n.8. The footnote continues with a lengthy quotation from Reich,
Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255
(1965), which emphasizes the importance of establishing security in entitlements-the thesis
Reich had developed in The New Property, supra note 2.
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summary adjudication." 4 Applying that balancing test to the
AFDC recipient, the Court found that the costs likely to be incurred
by such an individual upon losing the minimal level of sustenance
provided under the program outweighed the additional expense that
would be imposed on the government by requiring it to provide the
added procedural safeguard of a pretermination evidentiary hear-
ing.
The issue of entitlement to job security came to the Supreme
Court within two years of Goldberg in a pair of key cases, Board of
Regents v. Roth 5 and Perry v. Sindermann.'6 Factual distinctions
between the two cases gave the Court the opportunity to refine the
entitlement, or property, conception suggested in Goldberg. Roth
had been hired as a nontenured assistant professor at Wisconsin
State University at Oshkosh on a one-year contract. During the
year, he was notified that his contract would not be renewed. While
Wisconsin statutes provided various protections for state university
faculty members with four or more years of service, a less experi-
enced teacher was entitled to nothing-neither a hearing, a discus-
sion, nor even a good reason for termination.
Similarly, the Texas state system in which Sindermann taught
provided him with no procedural safeguards against summary dis-
missal; and he was fired without either a hearing or an official
explanation. Unlike Roth, however, Sindermann had been teaching
in the Texas state college system for ten years. Even more signifi-
cantly, no one in the system had formal tenure; instead, the admin-
istration had published rules and guidelines indicating that after a
"probationary" period of seven years faculty members should re-
gard their positions as "permanent."
Seizing upon this evidence of a de facto tenure system, the
Court distinguished Sindermann's situation from that of Roth. The
Court reasoned that Sindermann's interest had ripened into an ex-
pectation of continued employment-a "property" interest in his
job which could be terminated only for cause, determined by
appropriate procedures. Roth, on the other hand, had by the terms
of his appointment "secured absolutely no interest in reemploy-
ment"; in other words, he had no property interest that required
procedural safeguards. 17
14 397 U.S. at 262-63, citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
408 U.S. 564 (1972).
,6 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
408 U.S. at 578.
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Taken together, Roth and Sindermann can be read to suggest
three distinct levels of analysis. At one level are cases involving
"property" interests where, as in Goldberg, there must be an admin-
istrative hearing prior to termination. At a second level are cases
where there is no established property interest, but the recipient
claims an abridgement of his right to engage in a constitutionally
protected activity, such as the right of free speech." In such a case,
no administrative hearing is required, but there must be a hearing
somewhere before the recipient's interest in maintaining his job can
be denied. 9 Thus, in Roth, the Court remanded the case to the
district court for a judicial determination of whether the petitioner
had been terminated for engaging in an activity protected by the
first amendment. Finally, at a third level are cases where the peti-
tioner is unable to rely on either a property interest or a protected
activity-the case, presumably, if Roth had been terminated for
being a nasty colleague or an incompetent teacher. In such situa-
tions, it is not simply that the administration is justified in failing
to rehire; the teacher is not even entitled to an explanation of the
reasons for nonrenewal.
In Roth and Sindermann the notion of a property interest in
largess had moved from the footnotes in Goldberg to an established
"test" for measuring the security of interests. 0 Six justices reaf-
11 Both the infringement of property interests and the abridgement of first amendment
rights are actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
The "rights . . . secured by the Constitution" in § 1983 include activities protected by the
first amendment and property interests protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Whether a constitutional right to a hearing in some forum would exist in the
absence of § 1983 is a question the Court has not confronted.
" In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Court was careful to point out
that the district court had stayed proceedings on Roth's allegation that he had been termi-
nated for engaging in activity protected by the first amendment. Id. at 568 n.5. Thus, there
had been no evidentiary determination of that issue. The Court explicitly considered requir-
ing a pretermination evidentiary hearing as a deterrent to potential infringement of protected
rights. Distinguishing cases where such a requirement was imposed, the Court reasoned that
[in Roth's] case . . .the State has not directly impinged upon interests in free speech
or free press in any way comparable to a seizure of books or an injunction against
meetings. Whatever may be a teacher's rights of free speech, the interest in holding a
teaching job at a state university, simpliciter, is not itself a free speech interest.
Id. at 575 n.14. Thus, while acknowledging that "the right to some kind of prior hearing is
paramount," id. at 569-70, the Court did not require a pretermination administrative hearing.
"0 See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 599-602 (1972).
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firmed the approach taken in these cases in the next job security
case to come before the Court, Arnett v. Kennedy.2" Kennedy held
a nonprobationary position as a field representative in a regional
OEO office. In this position, he was afforded the job security estab-
lished for federal civil servants by the Lloyd-LaFollette Act: he was
entitled, in "such cases as will promote the efficiency of the serv-
ice," to notice, an opportunity to comment, and a written statement
of reasons for dismissal prior to removal. 22 By regulation, the agency
had established additional safeguards, including the right to a post-
termination evidentiary hearing. Nevertheless, when Kennedy was
dismissed for allegedly making false accusations of corrupt practices
by his superior, he appealed on the ground that, as in Goldberg, he
was entitled to a pretermination evidentiary hearing.
The six justices who adhered to the Goldberg approach, as re-
fined in Roth and Sindermann, proceeded to determine that Ken-
nedy had the requisite security of interest in retaining his job to
trigger procedural due process protection. Where the six Goldberg
adherents parted company was on the application of the balancing
test to the immediate case: three justices believed that the entitle-
ment at stake was sufficiently weighty to require a pretermination
evidentiary hearing2 while the other three accepted the more mod-
est safeguards provided by the statute and regulations..24
But a strongly dissonant chord was struck by Justice Rehn-
quist's plurality opinion.25 In his view, the Lloyd-LaFollette Act
could not be "parsed as discretely" as the concurring and dissent-
ing justices had argued. Rather, he countered, "[W]here the grant
of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limita-
tions on the procedures which are to be employed in determining
that right, a litigant in the position of [the plaintiff] must take the
bitter with the sweet. 21 6 In other words, rules structuring the grant
of government largess cannot be appropriately contained within
compartments labelled "substantive" and "procedural." Rather,
the procedural safeguards in the Lloyd-LaFollette Act qualified
the substantive right-were integral to the definition of the bargain
21 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
2 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501(a), (b) (1970). The Act is discussed in detail in Frug, supra note 1.
,1 416 U.S. at 206-31 (Marshall, Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
2 416 U.S. at 164-71 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring). Justice White, in a separate
concurrence, took an intermediate position. While he did not regard a pretermination eviden-
tiary hearing as essential, he did think that the existing notice-and-comment procedures were
inadequate in Kennedy's case because of the bias of the designated hearing officer-the very
supervisor Kennedy had charged with corrupt practices. Id. at 196-99.
21 Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart joined in Justice Rehnquist's opinion.
26 416 U.S. at 153-54.
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struck between employee and employer-and consequently estab-
lished the parameters of Kennedy's entitlement to job security."
Whatever its persuasiveness, the plurality view expressed by
Justice Rehnquist marked a distinct departure from the Goldberg
approach to defining property interests.? If in Goldberg the statu-
tory scheme had established the limits of the security of interest
AFDC recipients could claim, then Goldberg was incorrectly de-
cided, since the very issue in the case was whether recipients were
entitled to a pretermination evidentiary hearing in addition to the
statutory procedures. Similarly, in Sindermann, the Texas adminis-
trative rules and guidelines said absolutely nothing about proce-
dural safeguards. If, following Justice Rehnquist's approach, the
"for cause" standard gleaned by the Court from the policy pro-
nouncements of Texas higher education officials had been quali-
fied by the state's evident unwillingness to establish procedural
requisites, the state officials would have been granted absolute dis-
cretion in administering their de facto tenure system.29
What Justice Rehnquist's position demonstrated, then, was an
erosion of support for the activist posture taken in Goldberg and its
progeny. Those cases propound, in the name of constitutional due
process, the necessity for an independent judicial determination
whether a state-established security of interest amounts to a
"property" interest that carries with it a guarantee of at least mini-
mal procedural safeguards. By contrast, the positivist approach"0
27 For a thoughtful analysis, see Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive Rights, in
NoMos XVIII: DUE PROCESS 182 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977). The author suggests
that one must confront "the paradox presented by constitutional indifference to the substan-
tive content and indeed to the very existence of benefit programs, combined with deep
constitutional concern for the procedures through which those programs are administered
once established." He argues that the resolution of the problem requires a resort to categories
resembling the traditional distinction between rights and privileges-a distinction based on
the recognition that some kinds of claims against the state are intrinsically more valuable
than others, and consequently require more substantial procedural protection. See note 95
infra.
2', Chief Justice Burger, separately concurring in Roth and Sindermann, had indicated
that he regarded the definition of the "property" interests subject to due process safeguards
to be exclusively a matter of state law. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603-04 (1972)
(concurring opinion). But he did not take the significant additional step of treating the
absence of state-created procedural safeguards as integral to the initial definition of the
property interest. Earlier Justice Black, dissenting in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 275
(1970), had argued that "the government's promise of charity" was made on the legislature's
own terms. But his argument was addressed specifically to welfare benefits under the AFDC
program.
" But see Frug, supra note 1, at 982-83 (suggesting a narrower reading that would limit
Justice Rehnquist's insistence on synchronizing the substantive and procedural provisions to
construction of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act).
3 See note 44 infra.
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employed by Justice Rehnquist would eschew independent judicial
determination of the applicability of due process guarantees by de-
ferring to the statutes, regulations, and case law establishing the
limits of property interests. With respect to federal job security, for
example, the positivist approach entitles one to only that process
that has been authoritatively promised by official statute and regu-
lation.
Thus, the dialogue in Arnett reveals clear lines of disagreement,
not simply about the "value" to be attached to job security, but
more fundamentally over the very propriety of an independent judi-
cial determination of property interests in government employment,
or, more broadly, in the entire range of governmental largess. Those
lines of disagreement, rather clearly demarcated in Arnett, became
hopelessly confused in the most recent job retention case, Bishop v.
Wood.' At the root of the confusion is a conceptual weakness that
traces back at least to Roth and Sindermann; the identification of
this shortcoming may point toward a more satisfying methodology
for resolving these cases.
IX. FROM COLLOQUY TO CONFUSION: BISHOP V. WOOD
Carl Bishop had served on the Marion, North Carolina police
force for almost three years when he was discharged on March 31,
1972. The City Manager dismissed him on the recommendation of
W. H. Wood, Chief of Police, who claimed that Bishop had failed
to discharge his duties properly. More specifically, Bishop was ac-
cused of engaging in high speed auto chases outside the city limits,
failing to check business establishments and respond to routine pa-
trol calls in a satisfactory fashion, missing a number of training
sessions, and damaging the morale of the force. Bishop appears to
have been aware of the Chief's displeasure, and he was dismissed
at a meeting with the City Manager at which the Chief was present;
but he uncontestably did not receive an evidentiary hearing on the
propriety of his dismissal. He argued that the failure to provide such
a hearing deprived him of procedural due process.
The City Manager acted pursuant to a local ordinance, applica-
ble to public employees with service beyond a six month probation-
ary period, that read as follows:
Dismissal. A permanent employee whose work is not satisfac-
tory over a period of time shall be notified in what way his work
31 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976), aff'g 498 F.2d 1341 (4th Cir. 1974), af'g per curiam 377 F. Supp.
501 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
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is deficient and what he must do if his work is to be satisfac-
tory. If a permanent employee fails to perform work up to the
standard of the classification held, or continues to be negligent,
inefficient, or unfit to perform his duties, he may be dismissed
by the City Manager. Any discharged employee shall be given
written notice of his discharge setting forth the effective date
and reasons for his discharge if he shall request such a notice. 2
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, holding that the procedural safeguards in the ordinance
had been respected, and that, since his employment was "termina-
ble at will" under North Carolina law, Bishop was entitled to noth-
ing more.3 A three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the district court with one judge dissenting, 34 and on
rehearing en banc was equally divided in reaffirming. 5 Again up-
holding the trial court by the narrowest of margins, the Supreme
Court affirmed with four justices dissenting. 6
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority of the Court, held that
the district court's construction of the ordinance as creating a con-
tract terminable at will, subject only to whatever procedural safe-
guards the state established, was a "tenable" reading of North Car-
olina law; as such, he reasoned, it was binding on the Court since
the property rights-triggering requirements of procedural due pro-
cess-were to be defined by reference to state law. Both of these
propositions require careful analysis: the reading of North Carolina
law is dubious and undermines the authority of the opinion; but
more critically, the deference to state law in defining the substan-
tive property interest suggests such a sharp departure from the enti-
tlement theory developed in Goldberg and its progeny as to require
a reassessment of the underlying bases for protecting security of
interest in largess.37
Consider, first, the district court's reading of North Carolina
law. The district judge relied on a single case, Still v. Lance,"8 to
support the proposition that the Marion ordinance created a
1, Personnel Ordinance of Marion, N.C., art. II, § 6, cited in Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct.
2074, 2077 n.5 (1976).
Bishop v. Wood, 377 F. Supp. 501 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
" Bishop v. Wood, 498 F.2d 1341 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
31 See 96 S. Ct. at 2077 n.35.
3' The dissenters were Justices Brennan, Marshall, White, and Blackmun.
1' I use the term "deference" in its strongest sense. The majority treated state law as
determinative in establishing property interests, not simply as entitled to some degree of
respect.
279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971).
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terminable-at-will employment contract subject to whatever proce-
dural safeguards, if any, the state chose to afford. 9 That case in-
volved a high school teacher who alleged that she was not reap-
pointed because the board of education assumed she would be look-
ing elsewhere for a position during the succeeding year since her
husband's teaching job had similarly been terminated. The state
court's decision that she was entitled to no hearing on the question
of reappointment focused entirely on a statute that rather clearly
appears to regard teaching contracts as extending from year to
year.40 Moreover, the state court read the statute in light of its own
view of the realities of a secondary education system:
The nature of school operations is such that, in the absence of
evidence of a contrary intent, a contract for the employment
of a school teacher is presumed to be intended by the parties
to continue to the end of the school year and not to be termin-
able by either party prior to that time without cause and with-
out the consent of the other party.4'
The status of policemen hired subject to the Marion ordinance
is not illuminated by reference to the statutory framework of the
state educational system.42 The important question of state law in
Bishop was whether the Marion ordinance gave a public employee
a contract terminable at will after a six month probationary period
had expired. Still v. Lance is unresponsive to this question since the
3' The Court begins with an expression of deference to the views of the district judge,
who had "practiced law [in North Carolina] for many years." 96 S. Ct. at 2078. No correla-
tive head count of the expertise on the equally divided Fourth Circuit is offered. Since Still
v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971), presumably can be read with equal facility
whether or not one is an experienced North Carolina practitioner, it is hard to take seriously
the Court's expression of deference to the lower court.
11 The North Carolina statute provides in pertinent part:
All contracts now or hereafter entered into between a county or city board of education
and a teacher, principal, or other professional employee shall continue from year to year
unless terminated as hereinafter set forth. When it shall have been determined by a
county or city board of education that an employee is not to be retained for the next
succeeding school year it shall be the duty of the county or city superintendent to notify
the employee, by registered letter deposited in mails addressed to last known address or
business address of employee prior to the close of the school year, of the termination of
his contract.
Act of April 24, 1967, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 223, § 1 (repealed 1971).
279 N.C. at 259, 182 S.E.2d at 407.
12 If Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971), is analogous to any of the cases
discussed earlier, it is Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)-where the teacher was
also hired on a one-year contractual basis-rather than Bishop. Even in a term contract case,
however, if the teacher has a tenure track position it is doubtful that the agreement implies
a right to dismiss for any reason, including reasons unrelated to institutional needs. This
point is developed more fully in text at notes 91-94 infra.
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court treated teachers' positions as renewable one-year agreements.
Furthermore, the Marion ordinance includes a provision which ap-
pears to limit dismissal to "cause"-a standard that has no counter-
part in the educational proviso construed in Still.
The Court's superficial analysis of North Carolina law is far less
important than its decision to defer to state law as the definitive
source of required procedural safeguards. Suppose that Still v.
Lance could be fairly read as establishing that "permanent" public
employment is terminable at will or on whatever procedural terms
the state provides, so long as no explicit term of tenure has been
created. On that dubious reading of North Carolina law, which the
majority seems to adopt, we confront the real significance of the
Bishop decision. For the Court ruled that "the ultimate control of
state personnel relationships is, and will remain, with the States;
they may grant or withhold tenure at their unfettered discretion." 3
Hence, once the Court accepted the expansive reading of Still v.
Lance, the absence of any explicit tenure guarantee in the Marion
ordinance left Bishop and other employees vulnerable to the least
charitable reading of the statutory provision.
The positivist underpinning of the majority's position is still
more clearly revealed if we assume that Still v. Lance has no bearing
on the interpretation of local law." The ordinance may have been
tenably construed, the Court says, "as granting no right to contin-
ued employment but merely conditioning an employee's removal on
compliance with specified procedures."" Since the states-it bears
repeating-"may grant or withhold tenure at their unfettered dis-
cretion," a positivist analysis of Bishop's security of interest reveals
that he is entitled only to the narrowest possible reading of what the
ordinance has provided him: in this case, an unreviewable determi-
nation of whether his job performance has been substandad.46
'3 96 S. Ct. at 2080 n.14.
By "positivist approach" I refer to a conception of legal interests-in this case "prop-
erty" interests-that is based exclusively on the authority of state legislative, regulatory, and
judicial pronouncements, rather than on constitutional sources. In the context of defining
federally created "property" interests, as in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), the
positivist approach would rely solely on federal statutes, regulations, and judicial construc-
tions thereof. In each case there is no independent determination of constitutional due process
requirements.
96 S. Ct. at 2078.
" While the ordinance entitled Bishop to "written notice of reasons" for his dismissal,
see text at note 32 supra, the majority opinion treats this provision as merely a formal
requirement, not subject to substantive review-the notice could presumably say anything
or, in substance, nothing at all. This cavalier treatment will be reconsidered in much greater
detail in text at section VI infra.
1976]
The University of Chicago Law Review
Near the end of the majority opinion, the Court refers to a
dissenting view, "Mr. Justice Brennan's remarkably innovative
suggestion that we develop a federal common law of property
rights."4 This comment, it seems to me, goes to the heart of the
matter. For, if the cases beginning with Goldberg were not develop-
ing "a federal common law of property rights" it is impossible to
comprehend the decisions. One would have thought that the dia-
logue sparked by Justice Rehnquist in Arnett made that clear.4" But
the majority's attempt to reconcile its positivist approach in Bishop
with the views of the majority that rejected Justice Rehnquist's
position in Arnett raises the question whether the Court recognizes
the full thrust of its more recent decision:
In [Arnett] the Court concluded that because the employee
could only be discharged for cause, he had a property interest
which was entitled to constitutional protection. In [Bishop],
a holding that as a matter of state law the employee "held his
position at the will and pleasure of the city" necessarily estab-
lishes that he had no property interest.49
This attempted reconciliation completely misses the point that it is
not a question of which label-"property" or "no property"-one
attaches to the status of the job interest, but of who does the
labeling.5 0 A majority in Arnett most assuredly did believe that the
property interest in a federal civil service job was to be defined by
an independent judicial determination, from a constitutional due
process perspective, of an employee's reasonable expectations to
security of interest in his job.5
' 96 S. Ct. at 2080 n.14.
' See text at notes 25-31 supra.
" 96 S. Ct. at 2078 n.8.
The majority's attempt to reconcile Bishop with Arnett also indicates that it was not
establishing a distinction between federal and state-created interests that would grant the
federal courts authority to define property rights for due process purposes in the former sphere
but not in the latter.
11 See note 28 supra. For a criticism of the two-stage approach to defining procedural
protection for property interests, see Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Re-
vival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 Sup. CT. REv. 261. Tushnet argues for an independent
constitutional determination of the due process safeguards for property interests through a
limited revival of substantive due process. I think that a majority of the Court has, in fact,
been relying on substantive due process, although not clearly articulated as such, in deter-
mining entitlements to security of interest. The Court's approach remains, however, a two-
stage analysis in the important sense that the existence of an entitlement, whether we call it
"property" or a "substantive due process interest," is a separate question from the extent of
procedural protection granted.
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The point is perhaps most clearly made by reference to the
earlier job security cases based, like Bishop, on state employment
relationships. Justice Stevens makes much of the statement in Roth
that property interests are "defined by existing rules or understand-
ings that stem from an independent source such as state law. '5 2 But
one must underscore "such as," and read it in conjunction with the
immediately preceding language in Roth asserting that "[i]t is a
purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims
upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not
be arbitrarily undermined." 3 Most critically, Roth must be read as
a companion case to Sindermann where, again, no procedural safe-
guards were provided by the state. Yet, the Court refused to cut
back the implied "for cause" standard in the Texas rules and regu-
lations through synchronization with the correlative absence of pro-
cedural protection afforded by the state. Instead, as in Goldberg and
other cases, 54 the Court fashioned a federal common law of property
interests, with attendant procedural rights.
Thus Bishop undermines the entire line of job security
cases-indeed, potentially, the entire range of procedural due pro-
cess cases based on a federally defined property interest-while pur-
porting to be entirely in harmony with these recent precedents. How
did the Court come to such a pass? I suggest that the confusion is
an outgrowth of a failure of imagination in confronting progressively
more problematic claims for security. In the cases following
Goldberg the Court has failed to identify the full range of values
underlying protection of entitlements and, consequently, has been
insufficiently flexible in establishing threshold property interests.
Without an adequate threshold, the Court has been caught between
an attraction for creating security of interest in largess and a fear
of opening the floodgates to limitless claims for costly procedural
protections-hence, the confused retreat in Bishop.
I will argue that some of the recent cases, such as Roth, do not
52 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), quoted in 96 S. Ct. at 2078 n.7.
13 Id. Neither Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), nor Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593 (1972), contain a single reference to the contract law of Wisconsin or Texas
defining agreements terminable at will. In both cases, the Court interpreted the state statutes
and regulations without reference to state decisional law. Compare the reliance by the major-
ity in Bishop on Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971), discussed in text at notes
38-42 supra.
31 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), where a majority of the Court held that
the Ohio education code created a "legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property
interest. . . protected by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 574. But the statute itself afforded
absolutely no procedural protection to students, like the plaintiffs, suspended for ten days or
less. Goss is discussed in greater detail in text at notes 81-84 infra.
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go far enough in recognizing a property interest in government lar-
gess. Such an argument may appear to exacerbate a major source
of the confusion in Bishop-a concern on the part of some members
of the Court about facilitating a deluge of claims for review of ad-
ministrative determinations of entitlement 5 In fact, I will argue in
the next section that the floodgates concern can be alleviated if not
entirely dispelled by adjusting our sights downward through a new
approach to determining the relationship between threshold entitle-
ments and procedural due process. Initially, however, it is necessary
to explore how the excessively rigid methodology for protecting se-
curity of interest arose.
III. RETHINKING ENTITLEMENT THEORY: THE RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE
EXPLANATION
In Goldberg v. Kelly, once the Court determined that the recip-
ient had a property interest in AFDC benefits, it applied its balanc-
ing test to resolve the question of what process was due. In succeed-
ing cases this two-stage analysis-establishing the requisite prop-
erty interest and then detailing the attendant procedural
safeguards-was to become a familiar litany. 6 Indeed, a similar
method has been employed in determining the due process safe-
guards associated with the "liberty" protected by the fourteenth
amendment. In Morrissey v. Brewer,57 involving a parole revocation
proceeding, the Court tracked Goldberg in "deciding the minimum
requirements of due process":
They include (a) written notice of the claimed violations of
parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him;
(c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses
and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifi-
cally finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a
"neutral and detached" hearing body such as a traditional pa-
role board, members of which need not be judicial officers or
lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the
evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole."
15 See quotation from Bishop in text at note 109 infra. This concern is not limited to the
right-to-hearing cases. Consider, for example, the Court's increasingly strict construction of
the standing to sue requirement-always a litmus test of the Court's posture on the issue of
access to the federal judicial forum. See, e.g., Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization
v. Simon, 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
" See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
57 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
Id. at 489. In subsequent cases assessing the procedural safeguards required to protect
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Shortly thereafter, when the Court decided Roth and
Sindermann, it reaffirmed this conceptual approach: the teacher
who established a "property" interest was entitled to an opportu-
nity to challenge the sufficiency of the state's case at a hearing,
whereas the nontenured teacher had no procedural safeguards what-
soever.
59
The foundation cases on entitlements, then, developed a bi-
polar approach. Those with property interests were afforded the full
panoply of procedural safeguards employed in an evidentiary hear-
ing, while those who failed to establish a threshold interest were
limited to the procedures, if any, established by the state. Despite
assertions about case-by-case flexibility, once a property interest
was established the inquiry into what process was due developed
variations on a single theme: the adjudicatory hearing model.
Indeed, when later cases began to whittle away at Goldberg,
they continued to build on the same assumptions about the underly-
ing purposes to be served by procedural due process. In Arnett, for
example, the issue was framed in terms of whether a post-
termination evidentiary hearing adequately safeguards the entitle-
ment to job security. The debate between the six justices professing
allegiance to Goldberg was over the adequacy of evidentiary proce-
dures based on a notice-and-comment hearing model, taken to-
gether with a full posttermination evidentiary hearing. Similarly, in
the recent case of Mathews v. Eldridge,6" involving the right to a
pretermination evidentiary hearing for recipients of federal disabil-
ity benefit payments, the Court carefully reviewed the pretermina-
tion notice-and-comment provisions providing the recipient with a
scaled-down opportunity to present documentary evidence chal-
lenging the agency's determination that his disability no longer ex-
ists.'
the "liberty" interest, the Court has retreated from the full panoply of procedural ingredients
provided in Morrissey in a manner that parallels the limitations that have been developed in
applying the Goldberg balancing test to property interests. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 96
S. Ct. 2532 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). See also note 10 supra.
1, In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Court stated, "The only question
presented to us at this stage in the case is whether the respondent had a constitutional right
to a statement of reasons and a hearing on the University's decision not to rehire him for
another year." Id. at 569. The district court had held that Roth was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing, and the Supreme Court assumed throughout that the issue was whether or not he
was entitled to such a hearing. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), was presented and
decided from a similar perspective. "[Piroof [of a property interest] would obligate college
officials to grant a hearing at his request, where he could be informed of the grounds for his
nonretention and challenge their sufficiency." Id. at 603.
* 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
" Id. at 334-35. As in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), the claimant was also
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While these recent cases fall short of providing the full inven-
tory of procedural safeguards required by Goldberg, they proceed
from the same basic assumption about the relationship between
property interests and procedural due process: at a minimum, pro-
cedural due process contemplates some kind of a hearing-an
opportunity to join issue, through the presentation of evidence to a
decision maker who is then obliged to reach a reasoned determina-
tion on the basis of the submissions. Underlying this conception is
the vital interest in promoting an accurate decision, in assuring that
facts have been correctly established and properly characterized in
conformity with the applicable legal standard. 2 When we speak, in
administrative law terminology, about controlling administrative
discretion or safeguarding against administrative arbitrariness, it is
this interest in accuracy that we generally have in mind.
By equating procedural due process with a value that seems to
require a right to some kind of a hearing, the Court has correspond-
ingly been driven to set too high a threshold when arriving at an
initial determination of whether a property interest exists. In
theory, of course, the inquiry into whether a form of government
largess creates a property interest can, as the Court and commenta-
entitled to a posttermination evidentiary hearing.
The Court attempted to restate more generally the test to be applied in determining what
process is due.
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that
will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or sub-
stitute procedural requirement would entail.
424 U.S. at 334-35. If the parameters of the statutory entitlement were defined exclusively
by the legislative enactment, i.e., without an independent constitutional judgment by the
Court, such a "test" of the adequacy of statutory safeguards would presumably be unneces-
sary. Thus, the majority opinion in a case decided at the same time as Bishop appears to
reaffirm the Arnett majority's disavowal of Justice Rehnquist's approach. The case does not,
of course, involve a state statutory scheme creating an entitlement. But see note 50 supra.
62 See generally O'Neil, Of Justice Delayed and Justice Denied: The Welfare Prior Hear-
ing Cases, 1970 Sup. CT. REV. 161, 184-90. The author discusses a number of values, in
addition to accuracy, promoted by an "adversary hearing": accountability, visibility,
impartiality, integrity, and consistency. In each case, however, it seems to me that the
"value" being promoted is really subsidiary to the interest in assuring an accurate result.
Most obviously, impartiality is an important value because of our concern that biased deci-
sion makers will either find facts or apply them to the legal standard in a biased-and hence
inaccurate-manner. We are concerned about accountability, consistency, and visibility for
a similar reason: they serve as a check against the improprieties and mistakes inherent in
secret law. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TExT 88-122 (3d ed. 1972).
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tors suggest, be neatly separated from the question of "what process
is due. ' 13 In practice, however, whether an entitlement is estab-
lished or not is determined with an eye to the minimum procedural
requirements that would follow as a consequence of a decision in
favor of the recipient's claim. A threshold perception of security of
interest focuses both on the existence of a "property" interest and
the procedural safeguards attendant upon its recognition.
While procedural safeguards linked to some kind of hearing
requirement clearly are indispensable to the protection of some
property interests or protected activities, such safeguards set too
high a threshold for other claims of entitlement. The result, as Roth
and Bishop illustrate, is that when the state equivocates about job
security, a court cognizant of the high costs of a hearing requirement
in terms of administrative efficiency is likely to be reluctant to
recognize a property interest. The court then ends up affording no
procedural protection at all, even though the employee in such a
case may be on a tenure track or even in a "permanent" position. 4
In what way is a threshold linked to the right to some kind of
hearing too high? First, because preoccupation with a hearing ha"
diverted attention from the fact that a significant measure of re-
spect can be afforded the interest in accuracy with a more modest
procedural safeguard that does not have the same consequences for
administrative efficiency. Second, because excessive attention to
the hearing safeguard has concealed the existence of an independent
interest-what I will refer to as the interest in an adequate explana-
tion-which has a compelling claim for protection through a more
limited due process safeguard.
Fundamental to the concept of procedural due process is the
right to a reasoned explanation of government conduct that is con-
trary to the expectations the government has created by conferring
a special status upon an individual. The very essence of arbitrari-
ness is to have one's status redefined by the state without an ade-
Is See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975);
Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of
Interest Balancing, 88 HARv. L. Rav. 1510 (1975).
" By a tenure track, as distinguished from a "permanent" position, I have in mind a
probationary position where there is an expectation that the employee will attain permanent
status if his or her performance satisfies established criteria. See the discussion of Roth in
text at notes 91-94 infra.
' I am not suggesting that a hearing fails to take account of the individual's right to an
adequate explanation; on the contrary, the adjudicatory model, even in the modified notice-
and-comment form, does provide an explanation of the adverse determination. Rather, I am
suggesting: (1) that the independent significance of an adequate explanation is generally
overlooked in assessing the need for a hearing; and (2) that the vital interest in an adequate
explanation can be protected without resort to a hearing.
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quate explanation of its reasons for doing so.6" It is crucial that this
value be seen as distinct from the concern about administrative
accuracy-the interest in correcting wrong decisions. Obviously, the
two are related since a reasoned explanation is a means of assuring
the individual that the facts in his case are correctly perceived. But
I would insist that the respect for individual autonomy that is at the
foundation of procedural due process imposes a distinct obligation
upon the government to explain fully its adverse status decision.17
While such an explanation is surely one of the values promoted
by an evidentiary hearing, it is a serious mistake to conclude that
the interest in being informed of the rationale for detrimental treat-
ment must stand or fall with the determination of the need for a
hearing. Even if one is entitled to no additional procedural safe-
guards that might promote greater administrative accuracy, one
should be protected against a failure of the state to communicate
the basis for detrimental treatment. And that protection can be
afforded directly through the modest procedural safeguard of a right
to a reasoned explanation for the deprivation of an entitlement.
Moreover, such an explanation provides a real measure of sup-
port-even if less than would be achieved through a hearing-for
the interest in accurate administrative decisions. A decision that
must be expressly supported by a detailed statement of reasons is
less likely to be taken lightly. A reasons requirement would promote
a heightened sense of accountability, an added impulse to
investigate thoroughly, and a tendency to clarify analysis (and, in
some cases, confront dubious motives)."
11 The potential damage to the individual's self-regard and sense of psychic security
brought on by such an unexplained change in status is one of the central themes in Franz
Kafka's great work, The Trial (1925). Kafka creates the chilling ambiance of an unapproach-
able bureaucratic system that repeatedly issues highly individualized but unexplained and
unfathomable decisions that have the most serious personal consequences for the helpless
protagonist.
" Suppose that a procedure was established whereby a dismissed employee could select
a representative with the power to investigate and assure the accuracy of the administrative
decision, but that the representative was barred from informing the complainant about any-
thing except the ultimate conclusion whether the agency had acted properly. I would contend
that such a refusal to tell the employee why the state had made its decision would counter-
mand an important due process concern, in spite of the assurance of accuracy. See text and
notes at notes 81-84 infra.
" In this connection, it may be useful to distinguish large and small organizations. The
Marion Police Department in Bishop, for example, consisted of only seventeen officers. In
such a small organization, a dismissal action frequently embroils the chief official in a per-
sonal conflict with the grievant. As a result, it often becomes difficult to sort out proper and
improper reasons for the dismissal, making it less likely that the requirement of a reasoned
explanation will be honored in good faith rather than in a merely formal sense. In contrast,
in a larger police department or other bureaucratic organization the decision to dismiss may
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Procedural due process can be viewed as a layered approach
aimed at accomplishing a fundamental objective-protection
against arbitrary conduct by the state. One could view the rights to
cross-examination, confrontation of adverse witnesses, representa-
tion by counsel, decision by an impartial arbiter and so on, as var-
ious layers intended to provide increasingly effective insulation from
arbitrariness: each layer adds something to the defensive capacity
to ward off an arbitrary effort to destroy a status relationship. In
some cases-a job security case involving a first amendment claim,
for example-the balance struck between the individual values to
be protected and the costs of administration weighs so heavily in
favor of the individual claimant that a many-layered approach,
some form of "evidentiary hearing," seems clearly required. But as
we respond to less exigent claims by peeling away the layers of
protection-indeed as we strip away any semblance of a "hear-
ing"-it is essential that we retain the core safeguard against arbi-
trariness, the right to receive a meaningful explanation of what is
being done to the individual. 9
Of course, this right to a meaningful explanation assumes that
the individual has some substantive basis for claiming a right to
retain the entitlement he possesses. But once we cut loose from the
have to be cleared through a personnel officer or a chief administrator who has no personal
dealings with the grievant. In this situation, the requirement of a statement of reasons,
backed-as will be indicated-by the threat of limited judicial review, may persuade other-
wise indifferent and uninformed personnel officials to make certain that the line supervisor
has based his decision on the appropriate standards.
1 Apart from an insistence on regard for individual autonomy, the suggested right to a
reasoned explanation has nothing to do with what some commentators have called the nonfor-
mal aspects of procedural due process-the promotion of values such as political participa-
tion, a sense of community, or other relational ends. See Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10
HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 269, 310-14 (1975); and Kirp, Proceduralism and Bureauracy: Due
Process in the School Setting, 28 STAN. L. REv. 841, 864-70 (1976), discussing Michelman,
Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in NoMos XVIii: DUE PROCESS
126 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977). Without deprecating these goals, I think they
frequently are based on a model of an organic community that never had more than limited
application to American everyday life.
More importantly, I think fraternal and participational aims are of marginal importance
to government job security and many of the other status relationships established by govern-
ment largess. A termination decision means an end to any existing relationship; hence the
individual's principal concern is with his immediate treatment rather than the effect of the
state's action on an ongoing relationship. Cf. Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Wel-
fare Administration, 54 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1966) (arguing that formal legal safeguards are
inadequate where the parties are involved in an ongoing relationship and the aggrieved
individual is dependent on continuing favorable dispositions by the agency).
Moreover, even if the decision to terminate is overturned, the interest of most public
employees, disability recipients, or welfare beneficiaries in some form of fraternal relationship
in their continuing dealings with an administrative hierarchy seems speculative and highly
attenuated.
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positivist notion that substantive standards are unenforceable
where the state has failed to provide procedural safeguards, there
is a clear basis for establishing the relationship between entitle-
ments and procedural safeguards. Where a "for cause" standard has
been established, as in Bishop, one is entitled, at a minimum, to an
adequate explanation of how that standard has been applied. 0
Moreover, I will argue later that even where no substantive standard
has been established by statute or regulation, as in Roth, a non-term
position generally implies a right to expect that dismissal will be for
reasons relevant to institutional expectations about job perform-
ance. ' Here too one should be entitled to an adequate explanation
of the reasons for termination of employment.
IV. THE RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE EXPLANATION IN BROADER
PERSPECTIVE
Having asserted the importance of the interest in an adequate
explanation of adverse action, I want to place it in a broader admin-
istrative law framework. There is a curious tendency to view right-
to-hearing issues in isolation, as if the questions in these cases about
the appropriate degree of deference to administrative discretion
were entirely distinctive. 72 This compartmentalization of the right-
to-hearing cases is highly unfortunate. Widening the scope of in-
quiry, it is possible to identify a general concern about the principle
for which I have been arguing-albeit a concern that is ordinarily
70 It should be emphasized that the suggested right to an adequate explanation estab-
lishes only a procedural minimum. Whether more extensive safeguards are required is not a
question that can be answered by looking abstractly at the nature of the substantive entitle-
ment. Rather, once the entitlement is established, the question of what safeguards are re-
quired-what process is due-is determined by balancing the individual security interest
against the probable impairment of governmental effectiveness. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976), quoted in note 61 supra; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63
(1970), quoted in text at note 14 supra. Thus it does not follow, for example, that becaus6
both Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976), and Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974),
involved similar substantive "for cause" standards a right to an adequate explanation was
all that was required in each case. Proper application of the balancing test might lead to very
different conclusions about the appropriate safeguards. For a more detailed discussion of how
the balancing test should be applied to various types of substantive interests, see Friendly,
supra note 8, at 1278-304; Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U.
CHi. L. REV. 739, 742-57 (1976); Note, Specifying the Requirements of Due Process: Toward
Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1510 (1975).
11 See discussion in text at notes 91-94 infra. See generally Note, Implied Contract Rights
to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974).
72 This shortcoming is characteristic of virtually all of the cases discussed herein, from
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), to Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976). See generally
W. GEIA.HORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 590-730 (6th ed. 1974).
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expressed in the course of statutory interpretation.
A key case is Dunlop v. Bachowski. 3 Under the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, the Secretary
of Labor is required to investigate and, in case of violation of the
Act, bring an action against a labor organization that has invalidly
certified the results of an intraunion election of officers. Bachowski
claimed improprieties in an election for district office in which he
was defeated by the incumbent. After exhausting his remedies
within the union, he filed a complaint with the Secretary, who re-
fused to file an action on his behalf. No reasons were given for the
Secretary's decision; he simply wrote Bachowski a letter stating his
conclusion that no action was warranted." The statute did not spec-
ify any procedures the Secretary was to follow in deciding whether
to proceed.7 5 Taking an intermediate position between the Secre-
tary's claim of absolute prosecutorial discretion and Bachowski's
position-adopted by the court of appeals-that he was entitled to
a trial-type hearing, the Court read the statute to require "that the
Secretary supply the [union] member with a reasoned statement
why he determined not to proceed. 7
Bachowski should be viewed as an indirect descendant of the
Court's landmark decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe.77 There the Court similarly construed a statute that on its
face required a determination, and nothing more, by the Secretary
of Transportation that no "feasible and prudent" alternative ex-
isted to the use of public parkland in constructing a segment of the
interstate highway system. 78 Refusing to settle for the Secretary's
unsubstantiated assurances, the Court insisted that the adminis-
trator identify the specific factors that led him to resolve the issue
in favor of constructing the highway.7
7 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
u The letter said, "Based on the investigative findings, it has been determined ... that
civil action to set aside the challenged election is not warranted." 421 U.S. at 563.
71 The statute simply directed the Secretary to investigate complaints and stipulated
that "if he finds probable cause to believe that a violation of this subchapter has occurred
and has not been remedied, he shall . . . bring a civil action against the labor organization
.... " 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1970). It made absolutely no reference to procedures to be followed
by the Secretary in determining whether a violation had occurred.
421 U.S. at 572.
401 U.S. 402 (1971).
7' The statutes so construed in Overton Park were § 4(f) of the Department of Transpor-
tation Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970), and § 18(a) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1968, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).
1, Although the statute clearly did not require formal findings, the Court held:
[Ilt is necessary to remand this case to the District Court for plenary review of the
Secretary's decision. That review is to be based on the full administrative record that
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Bachowski and Overton Park turn on principles of statutory
construction. Moreover, they are at least partially responsive to a
concern for facilitating judicial review. The Court in Bachowski,
however, explicitly identified a purpose of its holding to be the
assurance of fair treatment for a union member when the statutory
scheme creates a special relationship between him and the Secre-
tary of Labor. In fact, the distinctions between these decisions and
the security of interest cases may be more apparent than real. The
Court's preoccupation with a reasons requirement in Overton Park
and later cases ° is no less than an acknowledgment that when
important interests are at stake, administrative discretion should
not go unbridled: at a minimum, fair treatment of competing inter-
ests requires that the agency explain in detail why one is to be
favored over the other. When the competing interests are those of
the state itself and of an individual seeking to maintain a conferred
status, I suggest that the threshold commitment to fair treatment,
embodied in an explanation of adverse treatment, rises to the level
of constitutional significance.
One last precedent, close to home, warrants consideration. De-
spite repeated references by the Court to a right to a hearing, it is
arguably the absence of an adequate explanation that is central to
the controversial holding in Goss v. Lopez."1 The case consolidated
a number of actions brought by students who had been suspended
from high school for periods of up to ten days under Ohio law, which
provided procedural safeguards only in cases of suspensions for a
period exceeding ten days. The students, who received only a sum-
mary notice of suspension, claimed denial of due process. While the
Court referred to the procedural safeguards it imposed as a form of
hearing, the requirements are a far cry from earlier efforts to employ
an evidentiary model.
There need be no delay between the time "notice" is given and
the time of the hearing. In the great majority of cases the disci-
plinarian may informally discuss the alleged misconduct with
the student minutes after it has occurred. We hold only that,
in being given an opportunity to explain his version of the facts
was before the Secretary at the time he made his decision. But since the bare record
may not disclose the factors that were considered or the Secretary's construction of the
evidence it may be necessary for the District Court to require some explanation in order
to determine if the Secretary acted within the scope of his authority and if the Secre-
tary's action was justifiable under the applicable standard.
401 U.S. at 420 (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973).
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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at this discussion, the student first be told what he is accused
of doing and what the basis of the accusation is. 2
At first blush, this procedure may appear to be a farce. Imagine
a teacher struck from behind by a flying eraser while writing on the
blackboard. In a fury, he storms off to the principal's office demand-
ing that he be supported in his efforts to control the class. Harboring
a number of grievances against Jones, a particularly unruly student,
the principal instantly concludes that the boy is the culprit. The
principal goes to the classroom, shouts at Jones that he is suspended
for ten days for striking the teacher with an eraser, and simply
ignores the boy's loud protestations to the contrary. Taking the
language in Goss literally, Jones has had his "hearing."
But such an analysis of the scenario, while perhaps not implau-
sible, is simplistic. First of all, it assumes no judicial review-an
issue to be generally discussed immediately below. 3 More to the
point here, the scenario reveals, by highlighting the occasional arbi-
trariness of official conduct, what I would regard as the fundamental
protection meant to be extended by Goss. Consider the facts of the
case. While six of the plaintiffs engaged in disruptive conduct wit-
nessed by the administrator who suspended them, the other three
fall into a very different category. One student, Lopez, claimed to
be a bystander at a lunchroom disruption that resulted in the sus-
pension of more than twenty-five students. No one testified that
Lopez was involved. Another student, Crome, was suspended be-
cause she was arrested-again with many others-at a demonstra-
tion at another school. Despite the fact that she had been released
immediately without charges, she was suspended from her home
school. No one testified that Crome was involved in the incident. As
to the third student, Smith, the school files gave no reason for his
suspension, let alone supporting testimony for its basis. What these
students were not given, and what I regard as fundamental to the
holding, was an explanation of how the administration identified
them as troublemakers warranting suspension. The arbitrariness
resided in substituting an edict for an explanation.84
$2 Id. at 582.
11 See text at section V infra. In the context of the preceding scenario, consider whether
a limited nonfactual standard of review would be feasible in cases arising under the informal
notice-and-comment standard of Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). If the right to respond
is to be meaningful, would it not be necessary to allow testimonial evidence on whether the
administrator took account of the response? In order to avoid the parody of an informal
notice-and-comment proceeding exemplified in my hypothetical, might the courts be im-
pelled to require in the first instance more of a formal evidentiary-type hearing than the Goss
majority anticipated?
"u While I regard the absence of an adequate explanation as central to the majority view,
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V. THE RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE EXPLANATION AND THE ROLE OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW
If the requirement of a rational explanation is to have meaning
it must be based on more than an unenforceable obligation to sup-
ply reasons. Without some form of judicial review, the individual
would remain vulnerable to irrevocable changes in status unsup-
ported by an adequate explanation since the reasons requirement
could be ignored with impunity. The principal benefit of judicial
review in this context is its likely deterrent effect on arbitrary con-
duct. If the reasons given for a termination decision are subject to
review, the agency's decision is more likely to be taken with greater
deliberation and probity in the first instance. The chance of a good
faith erroneous decision-based on insufficiently verified hearsay,
for example-is lessened, and the chance of conscious official mis-
conduct is also diminished.
Yet a judicial commitment to monitor the basis in fact for an
administrative statement of reasons would quickly bring us to the
brink of imposing some form of adjudicative hearing requirement,
either in the administrative or judicial forum or in both. Thus, the
key question is whether judicial review of the threshold due process
safeguard can be afforded that is both meaningful and procedurally
modest. I suggest that such review is possible along the lines that
the informal notice-and-comment procedure invoked in Goss is both broader and narrower
than my proposed right to a detailed statement of reasons. It is broader in that the Court
did insist upon an opportunity to respond. Such an opportunity appears to have been imposed
as an additional safeguard of accuracy:
Requiring that there be at least an informal give-and-take between student and discipli-
narian, preferably prior to the suspension, will add little to the factfinding function
where the disciplinarian has himself witnessed the conduct forming the basis for the
charge. But things are not always as they seem to be, and the student will at least have
the opportunity to characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems the proper
context.
419 U.S. at 584.
On the other hand, the explanation required to satisfy the "informal give-and-take"
standard is probably less demanding than my proposal. As such, it both diminishes the
impetus towards greater accuracy created by the requirement of an opportunity to reply, and
is less responsive than my proposal to the independent interest in a clearly articulated ration-
ale for the decision.
Like my proposed requirement of adequate reasons, the informal notice-and-comment
standard imposed in Goss can be viewed as a departure from the adjudicatory model of
procedural due process. Realistically, I would suggest, the cases, beginning with Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), that impose modified hearing provisions-and finally, in Goss,
a nonhearing safeguard-can be viewed as various options on a continuum, with my proposed
right to an adequate explanation at one extreme and the adjudicatory model employed in
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), at the
other.
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are spelled out in Dunlop v. Bachowski.85 After cataloging its bases
for a "reasons requirement," and emphasizing the necessity that the
judiciary avoid substituting judgment for the administrator, the
Court elaborated on the scope of review anticipated.
Except in what must be the rare case, the [district] court's
review should be confined to examination of the reasons state-
ment, and the determination whether the statement, without
more, evinces that the Secretary's decision is so irrational as
to constitute the decision arbitrary and capricious. Thus, re-
view may not extend to cognizance or trial of a complaining
member's challenges to the factual bases for the Secretary's
conclusion either that no violation occurred or that they did not
affect the outcome of the election . . . . "If . . .the Court
concludes . . . there is a rational and defensible basis [stated
in the reasons statement] for [the Secretary's] determination,
then that should be an end of this matter. .. " [citing a prior
district court case] .86
The Court continued by disavowing an intention to require
"detailed findings of fact," but warned that the union member must
be informed of "both the grounds of decision and the essential facts
upon which the Secretary's inferences are based. ' 8 In fact, the dis-
trict court had ordered the Secretary to furnish such a statement
prior to the handing down of the Supreme Court's decision-it is
attached as an appendix to the opinion in Bachowski. In it, the
Secretary provides a twelve-page statement that clearly shows how
he determined on a union local-by-local basis that even under the
most favorable inferences to Bachowski the maximum number of
votes changed in the district would not have resulted in his election.
It was just such a statement, the Court argued, that should have
been provided in the first instance. 81
I suggest a similarly limited standard of judicial review, provid-
ing an aggrieved individual with a judicial remedy when the agency
fails to supply an explanation for its decision that indicates clearly
and in detail why the adverse determination has been reached. It
can be argued that an obligation of such limited scope would fail to
protect adequately against the possibility of arbitrary treatment.
- 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
" Id. at 572-73.
' Id. at 574.
,' The Court, however, expressed no final judgment about whether the statement was in
fact adequate. That determination was left to the district court on remand. Id. at 577.
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Instead of receiving no explanation for the adverse decision, the
grievant might be supplied with an explanation that, beneath a
formal appearance of responsive treatment, is in fact totally false.
Thus, with only limited judicial review available, a strong tempta-
tion might exist to terminate relations with a disagreeable employee
by issuing a pro forma recitation of misconduct, whatever the sub-
stance of the case against him.
This argument overlooks a number of factors. The formality of
having to provide a detailed written statement of reasons is itself
likely to deter some, although admittedly not all, bad faith dealings.
To put it directly, many administrators would be uneasy about the
consequences of committing themselves in writing to a trumped-up
rationale for decision, if only because of the possibility of adverse
publicity. In addition, in any sizeable bureaucracy there are likely
to be internal controls, such as a requirement of clearance with
disinterested higher level officials, that would be substantially re-
inforced by the deterrent effect of potential limited judicial review.89
Finally, there are almost certainly a substantial number of in-
stances where erroneous termination decisions result solely from
indifference or slipshod procedures, rather than bad faith. The
threat of judicial review, even review limited in scope, is likely to
have a salutary effect in such cases.
Thus, I would argue that when reasonably held expecta-
tions-arising out of everyday understandings as well as official
rules and regulations-establish a threshold security of interest, the
holder is entitled to a detailed statement of reasons for the termina-
tion of that interest, backed by the assurance of limited judicial
review of the adequacy of the administrative explanation." Now I
See note 68 supra.
"Again, I should emphasize what I hope is apparent about my purposes. My primary
aim is to articulate a broader-and, as the next section will argue, a more realistic-view of
when an employee's interest in maintaining his position ripens into an entitlement. But in
arguing for the necessity of recognizing minimal due process requirements, I do not mean to
suggest the sufficiency of such safeguards in all cases. See note 70 supra. Sensibly applied,
the balancing approach of Goldberg v. Kelly seems essentially correct: some values, whether
free speech or minimum economic sustenance, do in fact require greater protection than
others. Similarly, some kinds of status determinations, e.g., misconduct inquiries, typically
involve disputes over whether certain facts occurred while others do not; this likelihood of
disputed issues of fact weighs strongly in favor of requiring adjudicatory procedures. Conse-
quently, it should be possible to establish an array of claims for largess entitled to varying
degrees of procedural protection. See text following note 68 supra; authorities cited in note
70 supra. I accept the notion of a continuum of interests and argue only that a lower threshold
should be recognized for purposes of providing the minimum protection. Because job security
cases, particularly Roth and now Bishop, have been treated as falling below the existing
entitlement threshold, they serve as an ideal vehicle for propounding my thesis.
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must demonstrate more concretely, with special reference to the
question of job security, where the threshold is to be established and
how the procedure is to be implemented. To do so, I return to Bishop
and the related cases from a fresh perspective.
VI. THE RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE EXPLANATION: REASSESSING THE JOB
SECURITY CASES
The irony of the Bishop case is that the Marion ordinance,
given a sympathetic construction, can be read to provide as a matter
of positive state law what I am suggesting should be a minimum
constitutional protection for status relationships-the right to a
statement of reasons. The trial court, however, adopted the bipolar
approach to job security cases taken in Roth and Sindermann: one
either has a sufficiently weighty interest to require the protection of
an evidentiary hearing or has no interest worth safeguarding at all.
The same theme resounds throughout the majority opinion in the
Supreme Court, although the deference to state law seems to turn
the issue on its head: if the state intended to create a "property"
interest in the job, Bishop would have been given some form of
statutory tenure with attendant procedural safeguards.
Roth encouraged a bipolar approach-but not deference to
state law-both by posing the constitutional issue as evidentiary
hearing vel non' and, correlatively, by suggesting an inordinately
sharp distinction between the expectations of tenured and non-
tenured college teachers. This was an unfortunate step. While it is
surely true that nontenured professors have expectations different
from those of their tenured colleagues about the level of competence
A related limitation of scope needs to be made explicit. There is no magic to existing
status relationships, in job retention or otherwise, as a base line for defining entitlements. It
could be argued that in some cases the job or license applicant has a reasonable expectation
of fair treatment that is sufficient to trigger a minimal entitlement to an adequate explana-
tion for adverse treatment. Again, however, the case for recognizing that applicants have
"property" rights simply underscores the fact that some claims for fair treatment are more
substantial than others-and there does seem to be special urgency to the claim of one who
has established an interest in largess which government is seeking to terminate. For present
purposes, I cannot go beyond suggesting what I regard as a more adequate framework for
analyzing these claims in the context of a single illustration, the case of job retention.
Finally, in arguing the salience of judicial review I assume the continuing existence of a
cause of action such as the present one based on the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970),
discussed in note 18 supra, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970), the companion jurisdictional provi-
sion. The courts have not had to decide whether due process requires judicial review in the
absence of a statutory basis, and I similarly want to avoid that perplexing issue here. See
generally Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial Review in the Processing of Claims for Veterans'
Benefits: A Preliminary Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 905, 907-11 (1975).
"1 See note 59 supra.
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that will insure retention, it is most emphatically not true that they
contemplate dismissal "for no reason at all." Rather, a nontenured
teacher anticipates dismissal for any reason related to institutional
academic expectations, including economic feasibility. This rele-
vance standard is very broad, and certainly legitimates considera-
tions of personal compatibility and projections of future productiv-
ity; it is a standard that within wide parameters should be set by
the employing institution. But it does not incorporate dismissal for
reasons unrelated to the job, such as distinctive modes of private
behavior, or termination for reasons that turn out to be based on
misinformation. A tenure track professor does have minimal expec-
tations of security, grounded in reliance that the institution will
engage in an honest inquiry and employ job-related criteria in reas-
sessing his or her status.2
There is no particular reason to limit this line of argument to
the academic sphere. Assuming continued economic feasibility, a
tenure track position-that is, one leading to "permanent" employ-
ment 93-is generally understood to imply a good faith commitment
not to terminate an employee unless it has been ascertained that the
employee is unsuited to the position. 4 Term agreements, which trig-
ger no such expectations, are easily enough established by express
notice or contract-although, I would insist, these provisions should
be interpreted with reference to federal constitutional standards.
Bishop then becomes a clear case: the employee was a regular officer
on the police force who had attained an explicitly provided
permanent classification and was actually protected by a "for
cause" standard. To hold that he had no security of interest, and
indeed would have had no greater entitlement if he had been on the
force for thirty years, is a mockery of the notion of property interests
in government largess."'
92 These expectations are, of course, entirely apart from the guarantees afforded to con-
stitutionally protected activity; the infringement of such activity is generally understood to
trigger the right to an evidentiary hearing in some forum. See note 19 supra.
,' See note 64 supra.
" There is no particular reason to limit this line of argument to job security. It is central
to the notion of due process that whenever government takes action which invests an individ-
ual with personal largess, whether a driver's license or disability benefits, there is an implicit
commitment that the relationship will be terminated only for reasons relevant to the existing
status.
,1 One could argue that job security is simply not sufficiently important, when compared
with other kinds of interests-for example, child support benefits or minimally decent hous-
ing-to warrant protection as an entitlement apart from whatever protection the state af-
fords. See Grey, supra note 27. Again, I would regard the importance, or "moral claim," of a
particular interest as principally relevant to the second-stage balancing test used in determin-
ing the applicable procedural safeguards. I do, however, recognize that at some point a
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The Bishop majority, by treating the employee as entitled to no
more than he received and polarizing the Court by insisting on the
primacy of state law, missed the opportunity modestly to effectuate
the broader purposes of procedural due process." Bishop's security
of interest was surely weightier than Roth's yet I argue only that
Bishop, like Roth, should have been given an adequate explanation
for his dismissal." It may well be that the costs of adjudicatory
procedures in a police department, or other agency with a high
turnover rate, would be considerable. It may also be true that the
bureaucratization entailed by such procedures would be harmful to
agency morale, either because of the delay engendered in effecting
the dismissal of troublemakers or because of the greater reluctance
to trigger an enervating process. But it does not follow that the more
limited commitment to fair dealing that I propose would entail
these costs. 8
Furthermore, judicial review can be effective without being
elaborate by limiting its scope to a review of the reasons statement.
A brief examination of the record in Bishop indicates the opera-
tional consequences of the standard of review I am suggesting in
threshold entitlement cases. The defendants' motion for summary
judgment was supported almost exclusively by a highly conclusory
and ambiguous affidavit from Chief of Police Wood. In his state-
ment Wood charged that:
threshold definition of property interests will exclude claims for due process protection: to
put an absurdly easy case, the individual who is summarily "dismissed" over the phone in
his request that the Park Service provide him with weather information at Yosemite National
Park. See also note 90 supra. In defining that threshold, I agree that one must take account
of the substance of the moral claim.
" Compare the contemporaneous treatment of the liberty interest in Meachum v. Fano,
96 S. Ct. 2532 (1976).
" It does not necessarily follow that the discharged employee in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134 (1974), was similarly entitled only to an adequate explanation. Indeed, it may be
that the police force, charged with maintaining public security, which frequently involves
team efforts under dangerous conditions, is sufficiently unlike the academic setting in Roth
that a different set of procedural safeguards is called for in these two circumstances. See notes
70 & 90 supra.
"1 To the contrary, it seems improbable that an obligation to provide a detailed explana-
tion of termination decisions would cause a marked increase in administrative expense.
Presumably, a conscientious bureau chief would have taken the time and effort to insure that
his termination decision had an adequate basis in fact anyway; thus, the added burden
imposed by a reasons requirement is merely a matter of providing documentation. It is
equally unlikely that the requirement of documentation, without the delays in effecting
removal caused by a hearing, would have any discernible negative impact on agency morale.
"1 It is essential to keep in mind that the testimony, discussed in text and notes at notes
100-06 infra was offered in the district court to support cross-motions for summary judgment
on the right to a hearing. At the time of his dismissal, Bishop received "notice" as nominally
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I had [Bishop] in my office on several occasions during a six
month period prior to his discharge, concerning high speed auto
chases outside the city limits, checking business establish-
ments in the city and answering patrol calls.
* , , Bishop did not attend training sessions. . . refused
to cooperate with fellow officers and did not take orders from
the officer in charge of his duty shift. Officer Bishop was the
cause of low morale . . . and a verbal complaint was filed
against him by Sergeant Arrowood. .... "I
Despite the wide variety of charges, Wood's affidavit was virtually
unsubstantiated. The sole supporting statement was one other offi-
cer's summary comment that "Bishop's attitude was to the effect
that he though he was the only man who did anything."10' Neither
Sergeant Arrowood nor any other member of the department testi-
fied to Bishop's harmful effect on the morale of the police force or
his personal misconduct. 02 Moreover, many of the charges are
highly ambiguous; what, for example, is one to make of the unex-
plained need to talk to Bishop about "checking business establish-
ments in the city and answering routine patrol calls." In his sworn
statement Bishop suggested that he was fired, if anything, for per-
forming these tasks too conscientiously. 103 In addition, he provided
supporting affidavits from two fellow officers on the force who testi-
fied that Bishop was a model policeman, highly efficient, well liked
and respected by his peers.04 Arrest records for the period Bishop
required under the Marion ordinance, but it appears from the trial record that the written
document consisted of nothing more than a summary statement that his work was unsatisfac-
tory and that he missed training sessions. This surmise was confirmed by a telephone inter-
view with Bishop's attorney, Norman B. Smith, Greensboro, N.C., on Oct. 14, 1976. As the
following textual discussion indicates, an adequate statement of reasons would have required
a more precise and detailed explanation of the Chief's decision than was provided in his
affidavit.
"® Affidavit for Respondents, Bishop v. Wood, 377 F. Supp. 501 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
"" Affidavit for Respondents, Bishop v. Wood, 377 F. Supp. 501 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
" The record indicates that Sgt. Arrowood was still on the force when Bishop was
decided below. See Answers to Petitioner's Interrogatory, Bishop v. Wood, 377 F. Supp. 501
(W.D.N.C. 1973).
" In his complaint, Bishop alleged that he was dismissed because "he treated the citi-
zens of his community equally without regard to their political or social status." The only
charges with any degree of specificity are those regarding high speed auto chases and missed
training sessions. Bishop testified that officers generally were engaged in the former practice
until told otherwise by the Chief and that he had complied as of that date. He gave plausible
explanations for each training session that he missed-in one case offering supporting affida-
vits from two state police officers he had assisted in an emergency while he was on the way
to a session.
" Both of these officers testified for Bishop, see Affidavits for Petitioner, Bishop v.
Wood, 377 F. Supp. 501 (W.D.N.C. 1973), despite their continued service on the force at the
time of the litigation.
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was on the force established that he made more arrests, by far, than
any other member of the Marion Police Department.1 5
A picture emerges of an officer who may have been fired for
overzealousness-more darkly, as Bishop suggested, for failure to
recognize certain class distinctions in enforcing the law.' 6 This is
pure speculation, of course; Bishop may have been fired for the best
or worst of reasons. What is clear is that the City Manager and the
Police Department failed to provide a reasoned basis for Bishop's
removal at the time of his dismissal. As a result, he was arbitrarily
dismissed.'07 In the absence of an adequate statement of reasons, the
court should have either granted summary judgment for the plain-
tiff or remanded for a further explanation of the decision.
I have subjected the Bishop case to rather close scrutiny be-
cause it is essential to establish the feasibility of requiring a state-
ment of reasons. In view of what appears in the record, how might
this obligation have been discharged? If Chief Wood had provided
a statement of reasons that recited specific shortcomings in Bishop's
performance of his duties, such as a brief summary of the alleged
"verbal complaint" of Sergeant Arrowood, or an explication of
Bishop's shortcomings in responding to patrol calls, then defendants
would have been entitled to summary judgment. As the Court said
in Bachowski, "except in what must be the rare case, the court's
review should be confined to examination of the reasons state-
ment."' The judiciary need not sit in review of substantial honest
conflicts in the testimony. If Chief Wood had provided a cogent
statement indicating that Bishop's personality was in fact creating
real morale problems, defendants would similarly have been enti-
tled to summary judgment, since a substantial degree of judicial
deference is warranted in determining the scope of relevant job
characteristics. In sum, my analysis of Bishop is meant to illustrate
'" Indeed, with the exception of one other officer who was well behind him, Bishop made
more arrests than any three members of the force combined. Affidavit for Petitioner, Bishop
v. Wood, 377 F. Supp. 501 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
'" See note 103 supra.
' See note 99 supra.
' 421 U.S. at 572. The Court listed as examples of such a "rare case" the complete
abrogation by the Secretary of his enforcement responsibilities, the prosecution of complaints
in a constitutionally discriminatory manner, and decisions "plainly beyond the bounds of the
Act [or] clearly defiant of the Act." Id. at 574. Bachowski is silent, however, as to whether
substantial conflicts in written testimony-such as occur in Bishop- require oral evidentiary
testimony. If they do, then the door is open for review of the truthfulness of the grounds for
the decision. While there is a very real attraction to judicial enforcement that would test the
truth of the reasons given for dismissal, the cost would be too high-especially in view of the
important functions served by the modest requirement of a reasons statement per se. See text
following note 88 supra.
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two propositions about the minimum requirement of an adequate
explanation: first, that the requirement would not transform the
judiciary into a superagency reviewing a multitude of claims, and
second, that those cases which do, in fact, transgress the standard
generally would not be particularly difficult to identify.
Viewing the floodgates with trepidation, the majority in Bishop
asserted that
[t]he federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to
review the multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily
by public agencies. We must accept the harsh fact that numer-
ous individual mistakes are inevitable in the day-to-day ad-
ministration of our affairs. The United States Constitution
cannot feasibly be construed to require federal judicial review
for every such error.' 9
This tough-mindedness is misplaced. The federal courts will not be
overwhelmed by a "multitude of personnel decisions" if the Court
adopts a threshold definition of security of interest that recognizes
the importance of an adequate explanation for adverse status deter-
minations and links that recognition to an appropriately modest
form of judicial scrutiny.
In any event, it is whistling in the dark to think that redefining
procedural protection of property interests to be a matter of state
law will somehow make the job security cases go away. A considera-
ble number of teacher tenure cases involve separate claims of in-
fringement of a federally protected constitutional interest-witness
Roth and Sindermann"0-in which case it remains clear that federal
judicial review and an evidentiary hearing are available."' Dis-
"0 96 S. Ct. at 2080.
"' In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), for example, the plaintiff had
publicly criticized the administration for suspending an entire group of 94 black students
without determining individual guilt. He also criticized the university's regime as being
authoritarian and autocratic. He used his classroom to discuss what was being done
about the black episode; and one day, instead of meeting his class, he went to the
meeting of the Board of Regents.
Id. at 579-80 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), the
plaintiff was president of the teachers' union at the state college where he taught. In that
capacity, he was engaged in a running controversy with the administration over its policies;
he had also cancelled a number of classes to testify before the state legislature. He alleged
that his dismissal was based on his criticism of the college administration.
" Apart from cases of professional incompetence, in which considerable deference would
continue to be afforded to the institutional statement of reasons, most academic dismissal
cases involve a faculty member protesting some aspect of administration policy. Whether the
controversy is over hiring practices, investment decisions, minority admissions, or a wide
variety of other issues of academic governance, a first amendment claim to protection can
generally be made.
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missal cases in every sphere of public sector activity are likely to
yield a fair share of such claims."' More importantly, even if the
federal case load could be alleviated by abandoning the effort to
define property interests from an independent constitutional
perspective, the interest of the individual in maintaining a base line
of protection against the indifference of a bureaucratic state should
not be sacrificed to other meritorious claims on judicial resources.
Moreover, consider again the facts of Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971).
There, it will be recalled, the plaintiff claimed sex discrimination in the failure to rehire her
because of her husband's dismissal. Presumably, the federal courts would be available for
adjudication of such a claim, or a claim of race discrimination, under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970).
"I See Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970). In cases
of race or sex discrimination public employers excluded from the provisions of Title VII
because of their size or intrastate activities could presumably still be sued in federal court
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), by alleging a denial of rights protected by the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Nor are potential claims for first amendment protection
limited in any way to the teaching profession. In fact, the employee in Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134 (1974), claimed a free speech interest in criticizing the manner in which his
superior-the chief of the regional office of OEO-was performing his job.
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